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Abstract: The literature on interest rate differentials caused by capital controls is mostly
case based yet. The present paper tries to find general evidence how large the interest
rate differentials – and thus the distortions of capital markets – actually are. Advocates
of capital controls generally argue, that capital controls (should) affect capital flow com-
posure rather than the total, analogue to Tobin's idea  concerning currency markets only.
Based on a new measure for capital controls, which is including information on the di-
rection of the flows, which are subject to the control, it is shown here with a sample of
86 countries from 1997 to 2003, that the interest rate effects are to severe to sign this as-
sumption. The results indicate, that capital controls, as they are commonly employed,
have significant impact on interest rates, hence risking accordingly high growth imped-
ing effects. 
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I Introduction
The discussion of the interest rate effects of capital movement restrictions has a long
tradition. While it might first seem obvious, that capital controls allow for deviations
from the interest rate parity, this is not necessarily true. E.g. Desai, Foley and Hines
(2004) argue, that substitution effects between controlled and uncontrolled asset flows
in conjunction with the fact, that at least major multinational enterprises have means to
circumvent controls by inter-enterprise actions, are sufficient to cancel most of the im-
pact of capital controls.
Surprisingly the main focus of the literature dealing with interest rates and capital
movement restrictions is case based, and hence, though the special cases of several spe-
cific capital account restrictions are well discussed (e.g. by Dooley, Isard (1980) for the
controls in Germany in the early 70s; Ito(1983 and 1987) for interest rate differentials
between Japan and the US; Herrera, Valdés (2001) for the case of the often discussed
Chilean controls of the early 90s), few emphasis has been put yet into a more general-
ized analysis.
This is especially surprising, since cross country and panel data studies concerning
capital controls are en-vogue for some years now. This is probably mainly due to the
seminal  works  by Quinn (1997,  2000 and 2001)  concerning financial  openness  and
Gwartney, Lawson (2003), where capital controls where first measured quite detailed
for a panel of sufficient length and width. Earlier papers where almost entirely based on
a single dummy as a catch-it-all-variable for capital controls, which has been published
in the Annual Report on Exchange arrangements and Exchange Restrictions by the IMF
for several decades. The lack of detail in the data made it hard to prove any findings be-
yond political issues. Especially the question, where there is a general tendency to use or
not to use financial market regulation is debated in this context(see e.g. Alesina, Grilli,
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Milesi-Ferretti (1993), where the authors were able to show the likeliness of capital con-
trols being imposed under different regimes, but also found an annoying lack for any
impact  on  growth  that  should  intuitively exist).  The  presumably most  quoted  panel
analysis is Rodrik's 2001 paper “Who needs capital account convertibility?”, where he
believes to prove the lack of growth impact of financial openness using data, which is
completely inadequate for panel analysis with such sophisticated questions. 
The present paper attempts to use data on capital controls, where – according to the
author’s knowledge – for the first time a measurement of capital controls is used, which
does not only distinguish between different control intensities in general (as Quinn and
Gwartney, Lawson do) , but does so for different kinds of control separately. Prime fo-
cus of the paper shall hence be, to discuss the interest differentials, which are possible –
or sometimes not possible - due to different kinds of capital controls.
The rest of the paper is structured as followed. Section II discusses the data set em-
ployed. In section III the basic model, which shall be tested, will be derived. The final
three sections discuss the empirical findings (section IV and V) and the conclusions of
these (section VI).
II The Data
(a) Measuring Capital Controls
The problems, faced by numerous papers on this topic yet, show, that it is all but triv-
ial to handle capital controls econometrically. Especially, when controls shall be ana-
lyzed for a broader choice of countries, several problems might arise. These problems
include for example the fact, that there is a great lot of instances, where capital controls
are not implemented separated from other policies, which are relevant for the discussed
dependent variables but as part  of a larger political packet solution (see e.g. Forbes,
2004). Though, this problem might be considered minor, because the additional meas-
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ures are usually going into the same political direction – i.e. liberalization or interven-
tion – what means, that the worst distortion one might face is, that the results should not
only be applied to capital movement controls but to controls as a whole. 
Another problem, that usually arises when analyzing political variables, is to distin-
guish “de jure” and “de facto” values of the tested variable. (For am more detailed dis-
cussion see Obstfeld, Shambaugh, Taylor, 2004, p. 9 f.) Luckily in the special case of
capital controls large deviations of “de facto” from “de jure” controls seem unlikely, be-
cause controls – if not based on law – are hardly to sustain, for there are no options of
daily capital control policy (without the need to change a law) that can be used to con-
trol, like this might be done with monetary policy for example. 
But the central problem, which is the availability of data, remains. As already men-
tioned empirical studies with the intention to include a broad range of countries or a
long period have to rely on one dummy alone catching all the different aspects of capital
controls.1 Such data is only a good choice to analyze the most simple questions. The
granularity of data is hiding such a great lot of economically relevant information that it
is near to impossible to research the causes of an effect. Merely basic information e.g.
concerning the frequency of controls can be derived.
Many authors – for example Quinn as well as Gwartney/Lawson – attempted to gen-
erate control indices, comprising additional information mainly based on the Annual Re-
port  on  Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange  Restrictions  published  by  the  IMF.
Quinn (1997) was the first to base an analysis of capital controls on a more detailed
variable. His analysis catches quite a long time horizon (from 1950 to 1989) but only for
61 of the IMF members. Different from this approach Gwartney and Lawson include all
IMF countries  but  as  a  drawback  their  index  is  only available  from 1970  onward.
1 This statement refers to panel studies only. Studies which are only dealing with one country usually
employ more detailed capital control  measures as for example done in Goh(2005).
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Though the big advantage of this index is, that is even shows more of the details than
Quinn’s.2 3
Since 1996 the situation concerning data availability improved significantly. In the
year 1996 the IMF started to report 13 kinds of capital controls in the appendices to the
annual report and discusses these kinds of capital controls even further in the text. So
for the past years data is available for over 170 countries distinguishing controls not
only based on market but also based on the direction of capital flows and the subjects at-
tempting the deal. This makes it possible to analyze some central economic problems
concerning capital flows, which are usually fruitless to be discussed without exactly this
information, especially without information concerning the direction of the controlled
capital flows. 
The information concerning anything beyond the direction of the flows might at the
first  glance  seem  an  information  overload  for  most  questions,  but  further  analysis
quickly shows, that the acting economic subjects are actually very important in some in-
stances. Having a closer look at capital outflows shall be taken as proof. Imagine out-
flow controls for locals. This does more or less close foreign markets for residents, giv-
ing the domestic capital markets an advantage. If the local situation is not so unpromis-
ing, that the local potential investors decide to cease investing, those investors who pre-
2  The Gwartney-Lawson-Index as it is indented to be can only be calculated since 1996 when the IMF
started to publish 13 different kinds of capital controls separate. The index is calculated as the fraction
of controls implemented in a given country multiplied by 10 and is therefore ranging from 0 (unregu-
lated) to 10 (highly controlled). The data for the earlier periods is derived from the text part of the an-
nual reports as good as possible. Though an exact match is not possible, Gwartney and Lawson show
with data from the later years that the correlation between the two kinds of calculating the index is
greater than 0.9, what makes the index quite reliable for the time from 1970 to 1995 as well.
3 A further critique of several approaches to measure the intensity of capital controls is found in Eichen-
green(2001).
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vious to a control would have invested in foreign markets will now probably invest in
their own economy. Outflow controls for foreigners, i.e. backflow controls, are a com-
pletely different matter. Opposite to controls limiting the investment choice of locals, an
outflow control hindering the outflow of capital invested by nonresidents (below labeled
backflow controls), as it has been imposed in Malaysia for example, will probably rather
reduce the total  investment  within the country than increase it.  Most investors from
other countries will include the lock-in effect and the rising risk in their calculations and
shift their investments to other competitor countries. To account for this problem but
keep the number of variables manageable for the further analysis the following four
classes of controls shall be distinguished: portfolio inflow controls, portfolio backflow
controls, outflow controls on domestic capital and controls on direct investment within
the country.4 For each of the four categories control intensity is measured analogue to
the Gwartney-Lawson-index, i.e. using a 0 to 10 scale to which single controls contrib-
ute equally weighted. Because the fdi-control-index is actually composed out of one
dummy it can only switch between 0 and 10. Though it is rescaled to ease comparison
with the effects of other controls.
After all it has to be resumed that certain distortions can never be prevented entirely.
Though the fuzziness of a combination of indices like the one, which shall be used here,
is distinctly smaller than the fuzziness of a single dummy due to the disaggregation of
the data, there there are still some minor gaps in the data. For example strictly upheld
4  The kind of capital transaction real outflow controls (in the sense that they are applied to the outflow
of domestic capital) is not matter of class building here. As a matter of fact even portfolio capital that
was subject to an outflow is more likely to be reorganized within the global capital market than being
retransferred to the original country in the short run. Therefore it is no major concern for what kind of
investment leaves the country but if investments leaves the country at all.
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controls in few markets might have a stronger impact than broadly employed controls
which can easily be circumvented by means of derivative deals. 5
(b) The Real Interest Rate
One of the major aims in the present paper is to give a broad range of countries for
analysis, so that it can be taken as granted, that the derived results are generally valid
and not only the effect of some special kind of control. The drawback of this is, that
countries are included in the sample, where the variety of possible investments is lim-
ited compared to the major industrialized countries of the OECD, which where the sam-
ple of most interest rate differential studies yet. While this makes it impossible or at
least unwise to chose a specific kind of investment as matter of comparison as it is often
done, an allover measurement for the economies rate of returns has to be used. 
For the purpose of the present paper an unweighted geometrical average of deposit
interest rate rdeposit  and credit interest rates r credit  as published by the Worldbank in
the World Development Indicators in an annual sequence shall be employed as nominal
interest rate. To calculate the real interest rate (r) the GDP deflator (p) (also used as
published in the WDI) is used. Due to the partially extremely high inflation rates in sev-
eral of the countries in the sample the simplified Fisher equation is not employed but
real interest rate is calculated exactly as:
1r = 1rdeposit 1r credit 1
5  Notice that this is not a classical de-jure vs. de-facto comparison, where the question is, in how far
certain rules are really enforced. Much more the question is of relevance, if rules can be circumvented.
Because the search of alternatives usually carries its own costs, there is a certain hindering effect of a
control even if it can be circumvented, meaning that the impact of this problem is only minor com-
pared to a de-jure-de-facto-problem.
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To compile the real interest rate that way, i.e. without regard to the exchange rate de-
velopment is one of the advantages of the otherwise data-enforced annual period of the
present analysis. Knowing that the (relative) purchasing power parity is roughly holding
in the long run, inflation is entirely sufficient to adjust between real and nominal rates
for national and international purposes. 
(c) The sample
The time horizon of the sample is restricted by the availability of adequate capital
control data. Due to slight changes in the mode of report the dataset starts in 1997 reach-
ing to 2003. For these seven years all 86 countries are analyzed, for which gdp deflator,
interest rates and capital controls are reported for at least some years in the employed
datasets. Additional to a broad range of middle income countries the sample includes 27
nations, which are classified rich, and 15 low income nations.  The regional distribution
includes all continents, Africa being slightly underrepresented, due to the great lot of
low level income countries, where the data situation is obviously very limitng.
III The Model
Two problems have to be faced, if interest rates or interest rate differences shall be
employed as indicators for capital market foreclosure, both of these have to do with risk.
As mentioned briefly one of the major problems is the correction for the risk pre-
mium that has to be paid by the analyzed economies. Not only inflation risk is a major
influence here but as well the country specific risk of default (which is only in cases of
home currency denominated debt measuring roughly the same). It has to be kept in mind
that all this does only apply, if one believes investors to act risk averse, that is, that the
risk premium does exceed the expected losses from realized risks. Otherwise risk would
only increase variance, hence decreasing significance and R².
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The second problem, which has to be dealt with, is inflation itself. Besides its risk
factor inflation risk, when fulfilled, might cause a difference between expected (i.e. ex
ante) real interest and the realized (i.e. ex post) real interest rate. This might result in
very low real interest rates in countries with surprisingly high inflation and vice versa,
without this difference being caused by capital market foreclosure at all.
Thus the interest rate model used, has to include this effect causing ex ante and ex
post values of the interest rate to diverge. 
Real interest rate r, as it is used here is defined by the equation:
(1) 1r t , i=
1R t , i
1t , i
 R t , i being the geometrical average of deposit and credit interest rates in coun-
try i in period t and  t , i being the GNP deflator in country i in period t.  That means,
that the nominal interest rate, as it is measured, can be written as follows based on ex
post variables.
(1’) 1Rt , i=1r t , i1t , i
Though, as it is well known, this nominal interest rate does not necessarily reflect the
intended real interest rate, due to the already mentioned errors in inflation rate expecta-
tions.  Much more the nominal interest rate in its origin is based on the following for-
mula using ex ante variables. 
(2) 1Rt , i=1r t , i
planned 1t , i
expected 
Thus, when t , i
expected and t , i diverge, r t , i
planned and  r t , i are bound to do so as
well. Two further assumptions, which are indisputable simplifying but should neverthe-
less reflect  reality sufficiently, allow to convert this  into the base of the hence used
econometric model.
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The first of these assumptions is, that is unlikely for t , i
expected−t , i to be correlated
between the different countries. When the average difference between expectations and
reality is zero, the average real interest rate of the low risk countries should equal the
planned real interest rate for low risk assets. 
Furthermore a fairly simple expectation model shall be employed, substituting infla-
tion expectation by the inflation of the preceding period.
(3) r t , i
planned=r t
avg
(4) t , i
expected=t−1, i
 r t
avg is fort his purpose defined as the unweighted average real interest rate of a set
of OECD countries with especially few capital controls.
(3) and (4) inserted in (2), then equating with (1’) leads to the following equation:
(5) 
1r t , i
1r t
avg
=
1t−1, i
1t , i
This is valid in the absence of capital market regulation of any kind or any other fac-
tors causing the real interest rate to diverge from its international optimum, like e.g. the
existence of a homebias.
Two major effects, causing this equation not to hold, have already been mentioned.
First of all there are capital market restrictions, which allow the domestic planed interest
rate to differ from the global one, as the capital movement restrictions, which are the fo-
cus of the present analysis. 
Additionally a way has to be found to integrate the distortion, which is caused by a
risk premium.
While  rating agencies provide sovereign risk ratings,  which are – due to their  so
called sovereign ceiling function – an often employed proxy for the risk of privates in a
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given economy, their employment proves difficult here. First of all not all countries are
rated by all agencies, which limits the set of available countries quite substantially. Ad-
ditionally the ratings often change quite fast within one year, making it quite hard to de-
termine the risk for a given year. This is especially problematic because these changes
are often done, after first risks have actually been realized. That is, that in many cases
the paradox result might occur, that an effect, which should result in an increased risk
premium, makes the real interest rate fall. And last but not least capital market foreclo-
sure is increasing the risk of a fair share of assets of a country; hence it is very likely that
there is a correlation between sovereign risk rating and the existence of some kinds of
capital controls. Especially this last point makes the sovereign risk rating (or any version
of such ratings, rescaled to match an cardinal scale) an unlucky choice for the present
analysis.
Thus other means have to be found to control for risk and other effects affecting the
real interest rate. Here a set of income dummies shall be employed, based on the world
banks division of countries in low, middle and high income groups. This is a way of at
least catching the general risk (and its interest rate effects) of being on certain point on
the scale of economic development without catching the effects of policy variables (like
capital controls) as it would be likely when employing the otherwise more precise fixed
effects for each country separately. 
The econometric model to be tested here thus is:
(6) RDIFF t , i =
0 INFDIFF t , i1 LOWINC i2 MIDINC i3CMRINF t , i
4CMROUT t , i5CMRBCK t , i6CMRFDI t , it , i
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RDIFF the  natural  logarithm of the interest  rate  differential,  INFDIFF equals the
natural logarithm of 
1t−1, i
1t , i
. While it would be possible to test on actual and past
inflation rates separately in the log form this seems unsuitable, due to the doubtlessly
high correlation between the two time lagged inflation rates.6 No constant is estimated
because the interest rate of an industrialized country, with stable money markets, with-
out capital controls actually should not (and usually does not) diverge from the mean of
these countries. The reason that logs and not absolute values are used is, that total capi-
tal market foreclosure should impact interest rate differentials very strong compared to
limited foreclosure due to the fact, that investment substitution becomes less likely.
IV The empirical findings
As it had to be expected the R² of the regression is rather low with 13%.7 Neverthe-
less a result like that is neither problematic nor surprising, when dealing with such eco-
nomic variables, where so many disturbances occur, without using the lagged variable
or fixed effects as a major independent variable.
All variables, but the capital movement restrictions concerning FDI, have highly sig-
nificant impact on the independent variable. As expected the sharply decreasing or in-
creasing inflation is a major factor, when determining real interest rates. Income respec-
tively development dummies are positive, which might be due to a risk premium as well
as (or combined with) generally higher capital productivity in economies with a low
capital stock (though the latter argument would be futile on perfect capital markets). 
6  The correlation coefficient after Pearson between ln 1t−1, i and ln 1t , i is slightly
above 75 percent.
7 Full results are found in the appendix.
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The strongest impact among the control variables is shown by inflow controls. The
lack of available capital caused by such controls in the concerned countries increases the
cost of capital – and hence real interest rate – significantly. Vice versa outflow controls,
increasing the available capital within the country, have the opposite effect of lowering
the interest rate. The strength of backflow controls is about half as strong, what had to
be expected due to the unwelcome side effect of preventing capital entrance once em-
ployed. So one of the major drawbacks of backflow controls – as employed in Malaysia
– becomes obvious here quickly. While capital might be struck in the country short run,
hence improving capital supply, the long run effect contradicts this result and limits the
usefulness of this kind of control drastically. The lack of significance in the FDI-only
controls had to be expected and is most likely primarily due to the ease of b such by-
passing such controls by substituting it with portfolio investment. 
The clear significance of the other variables shows how much capital controls actu-
ally  hamper  capital  movements.  Although  a  certain  share  of  controls  is  possibly
evadable they clearly affect the interest rate as one of the economic key variables. 
In developing countries the impacts might even be larger, than suggested by this ba-
sic  regression.  A major  part  of  the  development  dummies  estimated  for  developing
countries, which has yet been interpreted as risk premium, might be due to interest rate
markups which are caused by the capital controls, which are more frequently observed
in these countries. The reason, that an development like this is observed, is, that taxes
do not affect winning and loosing situations symmetrically and hence variance is not –
as one might think – without impact on the expected value of the total returns as Her-
rera, Valdés (2001) show. 
A closer look at the analyzed data  reveals that the measured impact of capital con-
trols is almost entirely due to the effect it has in middle income countries. While the ef-
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fects in rich economies as the OECD countries and some others bear the right sign they
are almost negligibly small and hence barely significant at all. 
While  this matches the expected results the poorest  countries of the world to not
show greater interest rate effects due to controls like the analyzed ones. The least devel-
oping countries are most likely exposed to such a variety and mass of economic shocks
and political instability, that variables like capital controls do only account for a minor
fraction of risk and rent considerations and are hence not of great importance.
V Some remarks on positive and negative interest rate differentials
It might seem unusual, that such a great lot of thought is given to interest rate differ-
entials  caused by capital  controls.  But  it  is  fairly obvious  that  engaging in policies,
which influence interest rates, means nothing but to tamper with investment and hence
with one of the key variables, determining long term growth chances. 
While attempts to increase the interest rate do almost certainly reduce investment,
and capital controls attempting to do so, have to be considered as the attempts to sacri-
fice growth for stability, the reverse is not necessarily true. Countries, which find out-
flow restrictions highly attractive, are most certainly countries, suffering from what they
perceive to be massive capital outflows. The wording indicating that the cause of their
suffering is only perceived to be the extent of outflows is chosen intentionally.  These
countries experience outflows, but they actually suffer from unrentable investment op-
portunities in their economies. These lacks of investment opportunities are causing the
outflows. Knowing that a huge home bias exists, that makes domestic investment even
more likely than foreign investment, if there are no artificial restrictions to capital move-
ments, it is quite clear, that the differentials in asset rentability are significant. This im-
plies that capital controls, allowing the policy to sustain negative interest rate differen-
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tials compared to the big industrialized nations dominating the global capital market are
not necessarily sufficient to improve investment. 
A rate of return, which is so low, that people wish to invest outside the domestic
economy so very much, that policy sees the necessity to react, indicates a kind of situa-
tion, which is similar to the Keynesian investment trap situation. Domestic investors are
more likely to substitute foreign investment with hoarding than with investment in the
domestic economy. A first look at the most outflow controlling countries quickly re-
veals that almost each of the 54 countries, which controlled capital outflows in all the
six markets (being the foundation for the INFLOW index) in 2003, is among the least
developed countries of the world. While the entire OECD is part of the  sample, just one
OECD country – the Netherlands – is part of this highly controlling group. Interest rate
changes due to outflow controls in these countries are possibly not as much caused by
rising capital supply in the domestic economy, as by the central bank's or government's
attempts to lower interest rates under the international equilibrium rate, which is possi-
ble under the control regime. While the costs of this kind of capital control, namely the
sacrifice of additional income due to the relatively higher international return on invest-
ments, do apply completely, the hoped result of increasing capital supply domestically
to force the economy on a higher growth path is arguable. 
Although positive growth effects are unlikely, one has to admit, that another motiva-
tion behind a governments wish to decrease interest rates, which is, that it is cheaper to
finance budget deficits, is perfectly working, as it has been mentioned e.g. by Wyplosz
(1999).
VI Conclusions
The impact of capital controls on domestic capital market is stronger than one might
have thought, knowing the seminal study of Feldstein and Horioka (1980), where the
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home bias has been discussed in some depth for the first time. Given the fact, that recent
studies (e.g. by the Deutsche Bundesbank, 1997) show, that still today – though infor-
mation costs and other transaction costs have fallen due to the rising of the so called
“new economy” - the home bias is strong even among only lightly controlling nations,
the herein found results  are even more alarming. Although even unrestricted capital
markets are not fully integrated, the additional barriers in the form of capital controls
obviously have significant impact.
Though there has been evidence, that a fair share of capital movement restrictions is
easily avoided by investors, it became clear, that controls have a strongly distorting ef-
fect on allocation. At least those economies, which do not have severely underdeveloped
institutions, don't seem to be well advised, when trying to “protect” themselves by steer-
ing capital flows. 
Most of the discussion among economists concerning capital controls is based on the
seminal idea first brought up by Tobin(1978) for the special case of currency as ana-
lyzed asset, i.e. a capital control that is severe enough to hamper chart based speculation
but not severe enough to affect aggregate investment significantly. But this does not
seem to be economic reality. At least the kind of capital controls that is promoted by se-
rious economic scientists does not have in mind, to hamper with the optimum allocation
of capital or the global interest rate structure in a longer run. Much more the intended
sense of this kind of control is to level the capital inflow and outflow peeks, hence low-
ering volatility of short term flows and therefore limiting the negative impact of invest-
ment “valleys”, which are not due to negative fundamentals but to speculative attacks. It
is almost unbelievable, that the impact of capital controls, remains restricted in this way,
looking at the significant interest rate distortions caused. Given the differentials , which
can be observed due to capital market restrictions, it is utterly impossible to deny, that
there is a harmful amount of misallocation beyond the indented function of smoothing
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capital  flows  and  restructuring  their  composure.  Keeping  in  mind,  that  this  mac-
roeconomic point of view does not even include other major drawbacks of capital mar-
ket regulation like increased corruption, the proposal to reduce controls as much as pos-
sible (developed capital markets given) can be made without having discussed direct
growth impacts here.
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Appendix: Result tables
Table 1: Full sample
(Dependent Variable: RDIFF)
 
Non-standardized
Coefficients
Standardi-
zed Coeffi-
cients T
Signifi-
cance
 
Stan-
dard Error   
INFDIFF ,307 ,061 ,216 5,004 ,000
LOWINC ,052 ,016 ,148 3,254 ,001
MIDINC ,033 ,008 ,222 3,872 ,000
CMR_IN ,011 ,003 ,440 3,826 ,000
CMR_OUT -,009 ,002 -,430 -4,234 ,000
CMR_BACK -,005 ,002 -,290 -2,832 ,005
CMR_FDI -,001 ,001 -,070 -1,188 ,235
R R-Square Adjusted R-Square Standard error of estimator
0,38 ,142 ,130 ,10385
Table 2: Middle income sample
(Dependent Variable: RDIFF)
 
Non-standardized
Coefficients
Standardi-
zed Coeffi-
cients T
Signifi-
cance
 
Stan-
dard Error   
INFDIFF ,231 ,090 ,143 2,559 ,011
MIDINC ,070 ,014 ,508 5,058 ,000
CMR_IN ,015 ,005 ,497 3,124 ,002
CMR_OUT -,012 ,004 -,509 -3,180 ,002
CMR_BACK -,010 ,003 -,439 -3,127 ,002
CMR_FDI -,004 ,002 -,216 -2,384 0,02
R R-Square Adjusted R-Square Standard error of estimator
,432(b) ,186 ,168 ,12579
Page 20 of 38
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Capital Controls and International Interest Rate Differentials
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Abstract: Since the Asian crises it is often taken as granted that capital markets have significant func-
tional deficits. Often these deficits are believed to be so very strong, that the ability of free capital markets 
to guarantee a more or less correct international allocation of capital is denied. It is argued that specula-
tion dominates capital markets so much, that capital allocation is purely random. This is one of the major 
arguments backing the present trend to reestablish capital controls, which emerged after the capital market 
distortions observed during the Asian flu. In the present paper it is shown, that capital markets, while cer-
tainly prone to many distortions, are well capable of roughly guiding capital to the proper place. Though 
allocation is not model-like perfect, this steals the thunder from the idea, that closed or government guided 
capital markets were able to perform better.
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I Introduction
The discussion of the interest rate effects of capital movement restrictions has a long tra-
dition. While it might first seem obvious, that capital controls allow for deviations from 
the interest rate parity, this is not necessarily true. E.g. Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) 
argue, that substitution effects between controlled and uncontrolled asset flows in con-
junction with the fact, that at least major multinational enterprises have means to cir-
cumvent controls by inter-enterprise actions, are sufficient to cancel most of the impact 
of capital controls.
The main focus of the literature dealing with interest rates and capital movement restric-
tions is case based. Therefore few emphasis has been put yet into a more generalized 
analysis. However the specific capital account restrictions in Germany in the early 70s 
(Dooley/Isard, 1980), between Japan and the US (Ito, 1983 and 1987) and in Chile in 
the early 90s  (Herrera/Valdés,  2001)  are  well  discussed.  This  is  surprising,  because 
cross country and panel data studies concerning capital controls are en-vogue since the 
seminal works by Quinn (1997, 2000 and 2001), where capital controls where first mea-
sured quite detailed for a sufficiently large panel. Earlier papers where almost entirely 
based on a single dummy as a catch-it-all-variable for capital controls, which has been 
published in the Annual Report on Exchange arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
by the IMF for several decades. The lack of detail in the data made it hard to prove any 
findings beyond political issues.1  
1 Especially the question, whether there is a general tendency to use or not to use financial market regu-
lation is debated in this context(see e.g. Alesina, Grilli, Milesi-Ferretti (1993), where the authors were 
able to show the likeliness of capital controls being imposed under different regimes, but also found an 
annoying lack for any impact on growth that should intuitively exist). The presumably most quoted 
panel analysis is Rodrik's 2001 paper “Who needs capital account convertibility?”, where he believes 
to prove the lack of growth impact of financial openness using data, which is completely inadequate 
for panel analysis with such sophisticated questions. 
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The present paper attempts to use data on capital controls, where – according to the au-
thor’s knowledge – for the first time a measurement of capital controls is used, which 
does not only distinguish between different control intensities in general (as Quinn and 
Gwartney, Lawson, 2003, do) but does so for different kinds of control separately for a 
broad range of countries.2 Prime focus of the paper shall hence be, to discuss the interest 
differentials, which are possible – or sometimes not possible - due to different kinds of 
capital controls.
The rest of the paper is structured as followed. Section II discusses the data set em-
ployed. In section III the basic model, which shall be tested, will be derived. The final 
three sections discuss the empirical findings (sections IV and V) and the conclusions of 
these (section VI).
II The Data
(a) Measuring Capital Controls
Several obstacles make the empirical work with capital controls quite difficult, especial-
ly, when controls shall be analyzed for a broader choice of countries. First capital con-
trols are quite often not implemented separated from other policies, which are relevant 
for the discussed dependent variables but as part of a larger political packet solution (see 
e.g. Forbes, 2004). However, this problem is only minor. The additional actions are usu-
ally going into the same political direction, i.e. liberalization or intervention. Therefore 
the worst distortion one might face is, that the results should not only be applied to capi-
tal movement controls but to controls as a whole. Secondly, when analyzing political 
variables it is quite common to distinguish “de jure” and “de facto” values of the tested 
variable. (For am more detailed discussion see Obstfeld, Shambaugh, Taylor, 2004, p. 9 
f.) Luckily in the special case of capital controls large deviations of “de facto” from “de 
2 Nevertheless this has been done for single countries, as in Chung and Ni (2002) for Korea.
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jure” controls seem unlikely, because controls – if not based on law – are hardly sustain-
able, for there are no options of daily capital control policy (without the need to change 
a law) which can be used to control, like this might be done with monetary policy for 
example. 
Availability of data remains the fundamental problem. Empirical studies with the inten-
tion to include a broad range of countries or a long period have to rely on one dummy 
alone describing capital controls.3  As said this measure is barely sufficient for most 
analysis. Many authors attempted to generate control indices, using additional informa-
tion from the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
Quinn (1997) calculates a control intensity index for 61 IMF members from 1950 to 
1989.  The more detailed but less commonly used index by Gwartney and Lawson in-
cludes all IMF countries but only since 1970. A further critique of several approaches to 
measure control intensity is found in Eichengreen(2001)
Since 1996 the situation concerning data availability improved significantly. The   IMF 
started to report capital controls divided by sector and transaction type. This allows to 
compile separate control indices based on the direction of the flows which are controlled 
and on the economic subjects who are controlled for over 170 countries. This makes it 
possible to analyze some central economic problems concerning capital flows, which 
are usually fruitless to be discussed without exactly this information.4
The following section shall show that not only the direction of capital flows matters, but 
that the economic subjects concerned are of vital importance, especially when outflow 
3 This statement refers to panel studies only. Studies which are only dealing with one country usually 
employ more detailed capital control  measures as for example done in Goh(2005).
4 Since 1996 the Gwartny-Lawson-Index is calculated as the share of uncontrolled sectors multiplied by 
10. The more detailed information on the direction of capital flows which is not included in the table 
appendices is not included in the new index. 
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controls are discussed. Imagine outflow controls for locals. This does more or less close 
foreign markets for residents, giving the domestic capital markets an advantage. If the 
local situation is not so unpromising, that the local potential investors decide to cease 
investing, investment by local investors will shift from foreign markets to the domestic 
market. Outflow controls for foreigners, below labeled backflow controls, which have 
been used in Malaysia, are very different. Opposite to controls limiting the investment 
choice of locals, an outflow control hindering the outflow of capital invested by nonresi-
dents, will probably reduce the total investment within the country. Investors from other 
countries will include the lock-in effect and the rising risk in their calculations and shift 
their investments to other competitor countries. To account for this problem but keep 
the number of variables manageable for the further analysis the following four classes of 
controls shall be distinguished: portfolio inflow controls, portfolio backflow controls, 
outflow controls on domestic capital and controls on direct investment within the coun-
try.5 For each of the four categories control intensity is measured as the share of sectors 
controlled, multiplied by 10. Because the fdi-control-index is actually composed out of 
one dummy it can only switch between 0 and 10. Though it is rescaled to ease compari-
son with the effects of other controls.
After all it has to be resumed that certain distortions can never be prevented entirely. 
Though the fuzziness of a combination of indices like the one, which shall be used here, 
is distinctly smaller than the fuzziness of a single dummy due to the disaggregation of 
the data, there are still some minor gaps in the data. For example strictly upheld controls 
5  The kind of capital transaction real outflow controls (in the sense that they are applied to the outflow 
of domestic capital) is not a matter of class building here. As a matter of fact even portfolio capital that 
was subject to an outflow is more likely to be reorganized within the global capital market than being 
retransferred to the original country in the short run. Therefore it is no major concern what kind of in-
vestment leaves the country but if investments leaves the country at all.
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in few markets might have a stronger impact than broadly employed controls which can 
easily be circumvented by means of derivative deals. 6
(b) The Real Interest Rate
The OECD countries are the sample commonly employed in interest differential studies. 
Capital controls being significantly underrepresented in these highly industrialized na-
tions makes a larger sample with a broader range necessary. Because the variety of in-
vestment instruments in some of the added countries is small compared to the OECD no 
specific kind of investment can be chosen for the representative rate of return.
For the purpose of the present paper therefore an unweighted geometrical average of de-
posit interest rate r deposit  and credit interest rates r credit  as published by the World-
bank in the World Development Indicators in an annual sequence shall be employed as 
nominal interest rate. To calculate the real interest rate (r) the GDP deflator (pi) (also 
used as published in the WDI) is used. Real interest therefore is calculated as:
1r = 1rdeposit 1r credit 1
To compile the real interest rate that way, i.e. without regard to the exchange rate devel-
opment is one of the advantages of the otherwise data-enforced annual period of the 
present analysis. Knowing that the (relative) purchasing power parity is roughly holding 
in the long run, inflation is entirely sufficient to adjust between real and nominal rates 
for national and international purposes. 
6  Notice that this is not a classical de-jure vs. de-facto comparison, where the question is, in how far 
certain rules are really enforced. The question is, whether rules can be circumvented. Because the 
search of alternatives usually carries its own costs, even circumvenable controls are hindering, mean-
ing that the impact of this problem is only minor compared to a de-jure-de-facto-problem.
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(c) The sample
The time horizon of the sample is restricted by the availability of adequate capital con-
trol data. Due to slight changes in the mode of report the dataset starts in 1997 reaching 
to 2003. For these seven years all 86 countries are analyzed, for which gdp deflator, in-
terest rates and capital  controls are reported for at least some years in the employed 
datasets. Additional to a broad range of middle income countries the sample includes 27 
nations, which are classified rich, and 15 low income nations. 
III The Model
Two problems have to be faced, if interest rates or interest rate differences shall be em-
ployed as indicators for capital market foreclosure, both of these have to do with risk. 
The first problem is the correction for the risk premium that has to be paid by the ana-
lyzed economies. Central issues include inflation risk and country specific risk of de-
fault (which is only in cases of home currency denominated debt measuring roughly the 
same). All this does only apply, if one believes investors to act risk averse, that is, that 
the risk premium does exceed the expected losses from realized risks. Otherwise risk 
would only increase variance, hence decreasing significance and R².
The second problem is inflation itself. Inflation risk, when fulfilled, might cause a dif-
ference between expected real interest and the realized real interest rate. This might re-
sult in very low real interest rates in countries with surprisingly high inflation and vice 
versa, without this difference being caused by capital market foreclosure at all.
Therefore the interest rate model used, has to include this effect causing expected and 
realized values of the interest rate to diverge. 
Real and nominal interest rates are connected by the following well known equation:
(1) 1R t ,i=1r t ,i1t ,i
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R t ,i being the geometrical average of deposit and credit interest rates in country i in 
period t and  t ,i being the GNP deflator in country i in period t.  However the nomi-
nal interest rate does not necessarily reflect the intended real interest rate, due to the al-
ready mentioned errors in inflation rate expectations.  Much more the nominal interest 
rate in its origin is based on the following formula using ex ante variables. 
(2) 1R t ,i=1r t ,i
planned 1t , i
expected 
Therefore r t ,i
planned and  r t ,i are bound to diverge, if t ,i
expected and t ,i do. 
For the present model two further assumptions are necessary. When the average differ-
ence between expectations and reality is zero, the average real interest rate of the low 
risk countries should equal the planned real interest rate for low risk assets. Therefore it 
is viable to assume that  t ,i
expected−t ,i  is not correlated between different countries. 
Furthermore a fairly simple expectation model shall be employed, substituting inflation 
expectation by the inflation of the preceding period.
(3) r t ,i
planned=rt
avg (4) t ,i
expected=t−1,i
r t
avg is for this purpose defined as the unweighted average real interest rate of a set of 
OECD countries with especially few capital controls.
(3) and (4) inserted in (2), then equating with (1) leads to the following equation:
(5) 
1r t ,i
1r t
avg
=
1t−1,i
1t , i
This is valid in the absence of capital market regulation of any kind or any other factors 
causing the real interest rate to diverge from its international optimum, like e.g. the exis-
tence of a homebias.
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However capital  market  restrictions allow the domestic  planed interest  rate to differ 
from the global one. Additionally a way has to be found to integrate the distortion, 
which is caused by a risk premium. While rating agencies provide sovereign risk ratings, 
which are – due to their so called sovereign ceiling function – an often employed proxy 
for the risk of privates in a given economy, their employment proves difficult here. First 
of all not all countries are rated by all agencies, which limits the set of available coun-
tries quite substantially. Further the ratings often change quite fast within one year, mak-
ing it quite hard to determine the risk for a given year. This is especially problematic be-
cause these changes are often done, after first risks have actually been realized. That is, 
that in many cases the paradox result might occur, that an effect, which should result in 
an increased risk premium, makes the real interest rate fall. And last but not least capital 
market foreclosure is increasing the risk of a fair share of assets of a country; hence it is 
very likely that there is a correlation between sovereign risk rating and the existence of 
some kinds of capital controls. Especially this last point makes the sovereign risk rating 
an unlucky choice for the present analysis.
Therefore other means have to be found to control for risk and other effects affecting the 
real interest rate. Here a set of income dummies shall be employed, based on the world 
banks division of countries in low, middle and high income groups. This is a way of at 
least catching the general risk (and its interest rate effects) of being on certain point on 
the scale of economic development without catching the effects of policy variables (like 
capital controls) as it would be likely when employing the otherwise more precise fixed 
effects for each country separately. 
The econometric model to be tested here therefore is:
(6) RDIFF t , i =
0 INFDIFF t , i1 LOWINCi2MIDINC i3CMRINF t , i
4 CMROUT t ,i5CMRBCK t ,i6CMRFDI t ,it , i
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RDIFF is the natural logarithm of the interest rate differential, INFDIFF equals the natu-
ral logarithm of 
1t−1, i
1t ,i
. While it would be possible to test on actual and past infla-
tion rates separately in the log form this seems unsuitable, due to the doubtlessly high 
correlation between the two time lagged inflation rates.7 No constant is estimated be-
cause the interest rate of an industrialized country, with stable money markets, without 
capital controls actually should not (and usually does not) diverge from the mean of 
these countries. The reason that logs and not absolute values are used is, that total capi-
tal market foreclosure should impact interest rate differentials very strong compared to 
limited foreclosure due to the fact, that investment substitution becomes less likely.
Although this model builds on an interest rate parity it is not necessary for the model 
that the interest rate parity is perfectly holding. That capital market imperfections may 
drive away domestic interest rates from the global equilibrium even in countries without 
artificial restrictions to capital markets has for example been shown by Fraser/Taylor 
(1990) and Caporale, Pittis (1997). Nevertheless, if  natural imperfections concerning 
the capital market are not systematically correlated with a special kind of capital market 
restrictions the resulting interest rate differentials which are not caused by political capi-
tal market imperfections are sufficiently randomly distributed and hence shouldn't dis-
tort the important results concerning the impact of capital controls. 
IV The empirical findings
As it had to be expected the R² of the regression is rather low with 13%.8 Nevertheless a 
result like that is neither problematic nor surprising, when dealing with economic vari-
7  The correlation coefficient after Pearson between them is slightly above 75 percent.
8 Full results are found in the appendix.
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ables, where so many disturbances occur, without using the lagged variable or fixed ef-
fects as a major independent variable.
All variables, but the capital movement restrictions concerning FDI, have highly signifi-
cant impact on the independent variable. As expected the sharply decreasing or increas-
ing inflation is a major factor, when determining real interest rates. Income respectively 
development dummies are positive, which might be due to a risk premium as well as (or 
combined with) generally higher capital productivity in economies with a low capital 
stock (though the latter argument would be futile on perfect capital markets). The stron-
gest impact among the control variables is shown by inflow controls. The lack of avail-
able capital caused by such controls in the concerned countries increases the cost of cap-
ital – and hence real interest rate – significantly. Vice versa outflow controls, increasing 
the available capital within the country, have the opposite effect of lowering the interest 
rate. The impact of backflow is about half as strong due to the unwelcome side effect of 
preventing capital entrance once employed. So one of the major drawbacks of backflow 
controls becomes obvious here quickly. While capital might be struck in the country 
short run, hence improving capital supply, the long run effect contradicts this result and 
limits the usefulness of this kind of control drastically. The lack of significance in the 
FDI-only controls had to be expected and is most likely primarily due to the ease of by-
passing such controls by substituting it with portfolio investment. Although a certain 
share of controls is possibly evadable the clear significance of the other variables shows 
that they clearly affect the interest rate as one of the economic key variables. 
In developing countries the impacts might even be larger, than suggested by this basic 
regression.  A major  part  of  the  development  dummies  estimated  in  these  countries 
might not be due to risk premium but to interest rate markups caused by capital controls, 
which are more frequently observed in these countries. The reason for this effect is taxes 
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do not affect winning and loosing situations symmetrically. Hence variance is not with-
out impact on the expected value of the total returns as Herrera, Valdés (2001) shows. 
A closer look at the analyzed data  reveals that the measured impact of capital controls 
is almost entirely due to its effect in middle income countries. While the effects in rich 
economies as the OECD countries bear the right sign they are almost negligibly small 
and hence barely significant. While this matches the expected results, the poorest coun-
tries of the world do not show greater interest rate effects due to controls. The least de-
veloped countries  are  most  likely exposed  to  such a  variety and  mass  of  economic 
shocks and political instability, that variables like capital controls do only account for a 
minor fraction of risk and rent considerations and are not of great importance.
V Some remarks on positive and negative interest rate differentials
It might seem unusual, that such a great lot of thought is given to interest rate differen-
tials caused by capital controls. But it is fairly obvious that engaging in policies, which 
influence interest rates, means to tamper with investment which is strongly influencing 
long term growth chances. Attempts to increase the interest rate do almost certainly re-
duce investment. Capital controls attempting to do so try to sacrifice growth for stabili-
ty. Nevertheless, countries, which find outflow restrictions highly attractive, are most 
certainly countries, experiencing massive capital outflows. They actually suffer from un-
rentable investment opportunities in their economies, which are causing the outflows. 
Knowing that a huge home bias exists, which makes domestic investment more likely 
than foreign investment even if there are no artificial restrictions to capital movements, 
it is quite clear, that the differentials in asset rentability are significant. Therefore capital 
controls, allowing the policy to sustain negative interest rate differentials compared to 
the big industrialized nations dominating the global capital market are not necessarily 
sufficient to improve investment. A rate of return, which is so low, that people wish to 
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invest outside the domestic economy enough for policy to react, indicates a situation, 
which is similar to the Keynesian investment trap. Domestic investors are more likely to 
substitute foreign investment with hoarding than with investment in the domestic econo-
my. A first look at the 54 most outflow controlling countries in 2003 quickly reveals 
that almost each of these, is among the least developed countries of the world. While the 
entire OECD is part of the  sample, one member (the Netherlands) is part of this highly 
controlling group. Interest rate changes due to outflow controls in these countries are 
possibly not  caused by rising capital supply in the domestic economy but by the central 
bank's or government's attempts to lower interest rates under the international equilibri-
um rate, which is possible under the control regime. While the costs of this kind of capi-
tal control, namely the sacrifice of additional income due to the relatively higher interna-
tional return on investments, do apply completely, the wished result of increasing capital 
supply domestically to force the economy on a higher growth path is arguable.
Although positive growth effects are unlikely, decreasing interest rates eases the financ-
ing of budget deficits. This might be an important, still working motivation for govern-
ments as mentioned by Wyplosz(1999) 
VI Conclusions
The impact of capital controls on domestic capital market is stronger than one might 
have thought, knowing the seminal study of Feldstein and Horioka (1980), where the 
home bias has been discussed in some depth for the first time. Given the fact, that recent 
studies (e.g. by the Deutsche Bundesbank, 1997) show, that still today the home bias is 
strong even among only lightly controlling nations, the herein found results are even 
more alarming. Although even unrestricted capital markets are not fully integrated, the 
additional barriers in the form of capital controls have significant impact.  That a fair 
share of capital movement restrictions is easily avoided by investors, does not prevent 
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strongly distorting effect on allocation. At least those economies, which do not have se-
verely underdeveloped institutions, don't seem to be well advised, when trying to “pro-
tect” themselves by steering capital flows. 
The intention of capital controls is to level the capital inflow and outflow peeks, hence 
lowering volatility of short term flows and therefore limiting the negative impact of in-
vestment “valleys”, which are not due to negative fundamentals but to speculative at-
tacks (Tobin, 1978). At least the kind of capital controls, which is promoted by serious 
economic scientists does not have in mind, to hamper with the optimum allocation of 
capital or the global interest rate structure in a longer run. Nevertheless, this does not 
seem to be economic reality.  It is almost unbelievable, that the impact of capital con-
trols, remains restricted in this way, looking at the significant interest rate distortions 
caused. Given the differentials , which can be observed due to capital market restric-
tions, it is utterly impossible to deny, that there is a harmful amount of misallocation be-
yond the indented function of smoothing capital flows and restructuring their compo-
sure. This macroeconomic point of view does not even include other major drawbacks 
of capital market regulation like increased corruption. The proposal to reduce controls 
as much as possible (developed capital markets given) therefore can be made without 
having discussed direct growth impacts here.
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Appendix: Result tables
Table 1: Full sample
(Dependent Variable: RDIFF)
 
Non-standardized 
Coefficients
Standar-
dized Coeffici-
ents T
Signifi-
cance
 β
Stan-
dard Error   
INFDIFF ,307 ,061 ,216 5,004 ,000
LOWINC ,052 ,016 ,148 3,254 ,001
MIDINC ,033 ,008 ,222 3,872 ,000
CMR_IN ,011 ,003 ,440 3,826 ,000
CMR_OUT -,009 ,002 -,430 -4,234 ,000
CMR_BACK -,005 ,002 -,290 -2,832 ,005
CMR_FDI -,001 ,001 -,070 -1,188 ,235
R R-Square Adjusted R-Square Standard error of estimator
0,38 ,142 ,130 ,10385
Table 2: Middle income sample
(Dependent Variable: RDIFF)
 
Non-standardized 
Coefficients
Standar-
dized Coeffici-
ents T
Signifi-
cance
 β
Stan-
dard Error   
INFDIFF ,231 ,090 ,143 2,559 ,011
MIDINC ,070 ,014 ,508 5,058 ,000
CMR_IN ,015 ,005 ,497 3,124 ,002
CMR_OUT -,012 ,004 -,509 -3,180 ,002
CMR_BACK -,010 ,003 -,439 -3,127 ,002
CMR_FDI -,004 ,002 -,216 -2,384 0,02
R R-Square Adjusted R-Square Standard error of estimator
,432(b) ,186 ,168 ,12579
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